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Welfare  has  been  the  subject  of  intense  debate  throughout
recorded  history.  The  present  concept  probably  originated  in  the
concept  of  the  human  responsibility  of  individuals  to  the  destitute.
By tradition this assistance role has been played  by families,  churches,
and  fraternal  orders.  As  industrialization  and  specialization  have
increased,  welfare  assistance  has  become  institutionalized,  and  the
responsibility  for it has been assumed  more  and more by  government.
Since  the  passage  of  the  Social  Security  Act  in  1935,  categorical
aid-to  the blind,  disabled,  aged,  and  female  heads  of families  with
dependent  children-has  been  widely  accepted  as  a  necessary  and
proper  function  of government.
Recent  debate  has  focused  primarily  on  principles  or  moral
values  involved  in  welfare  assistance,  the  size  and  character  of  the
target population,  and more  effective  strategies  for  reducing  poverty.
The  philosophy  of  most  welfare  programs  is  that  employable
people  earn  their income  in  the labor  force,  and  that  unemployment
insurance  and  Social  Security  should  provide  protection  against
swings  in  employment  and  individual  misfortune,  including  retire-
ment  and  old  age.  Workers  pay  premiums  to  operate  the  insurance
programs.  Welfare  programs  were  thought  to  be  for  the  residual  of
nonemployable  persons  and,  in  general,  able-bodied  males  were  not
eligible  for welfare.  The system  was  built  as  an optional  effort jointly
financed  by  all  levels  of  government  to provide  for  the  categories  of
needy-optional  because  the  states  and  localities  determined  the
level,  and even  the existence,  of many programs.
In  the  "war  on  poverty"  efforts  of  the  mid-1960's,  it  became
clear  that  a  welfare  program  providing  only  for  the  residual  group
of  unemployed  was  not  adequate.  In  1965,  about  one-third  of  all
persons  in  poverty  lived  in  families  headed  by  full-time  employed
male  workers.  The arithmetic  is simple-a man working  2,000 hours
at the minimum wage of  $1.60 per hour would  earn $3,200,  which is
below the poverty line for a nonfarm family  of four.  As many as  one-
half of the working  poor have  families  of six persons  or more.  More-
over, jobs at minimum wage  levels are characterized  by lay-offs, short
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full-time jobs in  1965  that paid less  than the  federal  minimum  wage.
The  war  on  poverty  efforts  were  focused  primarily  on  strategies
to  create  long-run  income  opportunities.  Partly  as  a  result,  today's
income  maintenance  programs  differ  only  in  degree  from  those  of
the  past.  Their  inadequacies  fueled  the  debate  that  has  focused  on
the  recommendations  of  the  President's  Commission  on  Income
Maintenance  Programs  and  the  administration's  Family  Assistance
Plan,  presented  in  the  summer  of  1969.  It  is  significant  that  the
concept  of  helping  the  working  poor  is  prominent  in  both.  The
Commission's plan  would assist poor people,  working  or unemployed,
whether  or  not  they  support  children.  The  administration's  plan
would  assist  only  families  with  children.
IMPACT  ON  RURAL  AREAS
I  assume  that  nationalized  welfare  means:
1.  Standard minimum welfare  payments.  Some  states  would  have
higher  than  minimum  levels,  but  no  state  would  have  lower
levels.
2.  Nationwide  eligibility  standards.
3.  Income  maintenance  payments  that  would  be  available  to
the  fully  employed  who  continue  in  poverty  in  spite  of  their
work  income.  This  means  that  the  earlier  concept  of  a  100
percent  tax  on  the  earnings  of  welfare  recipients  would  be
reduced  for  a limited  amount  of  earned  income.
To  analyze  the  impact  of  nationalized  welfare  on  rural  areas,  I
will  also  assume:
1.  Most  of  the  benefits  would  go  to  families  with  dependent
children.
2.  Considering  both  farm  and  nonfarm  rural  poor,  about  45
percent would be eligible for participation  (compared  to  about
20  percent  participation  in  1967).  This  is  a  rough  guess  at
eligibility  under  the  Family  Assistance  Plan  for  rural  farm
and  nonfarm  families.
3.  Of the  remainder,  about two-thirds  would  be eligible  for some
other  assistance  programs  such  as  aid  to  the  disabled.
4.  About 20 percent  of  the  rural poor would  not be  eligible  for
any  program.
5.  Program  participation would  be  substantially  lower  than
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would  be  5  to  10  percentage  points  lower  for  rural  than  for
urban  areas  for  three  reasons.  First,  rural people  would have
greater  difficulty  in  conforming  with  program  requirements
because  offices  are distant and  transportation  difficult.  Second,
some  program  requirements,  such  as  registration  at  local
employment  offices,  may  be  more  difficult  in  rural  areas
(many  counties-about  1,000-have  no  employment  office).
Finally,  lack  of information  or uncertainty,  unwillingness,  and
other personal  reasons  are  likely  to  prevent  participation.
The  gross impact  of  nationalization  of  welfare  programs  can  be
indicated  by  the  program  dimension  of  the  proposed  Family  As-
sistance  Plan.  As of  September  1970,  we estimated that the program
could  provide  about  $1.5  billion  worth  of  cash  benefits  for  1.4
million rural families in 1971;  that is,  rural families  would  be  eligible
for  this  amount  of  benefit.  This  would  mean  an  increase  of  $0.9
billion in benefits  and  1.0 million more eligible families than in  1969.
Other  proposals  with  more  liberal  proposals  involve  substantially
greater  dollar  benefits.
IMPACT  ON  MIGRATION
The  local  impact  of  nationalizing  welfare  has  been  widely  dis-
cussed  in  the  press  this  year.  Fortune Magazine,  in  the  July  1970
issue,  calls  the  administration's  proposed  plan  a  looming  money
revolution for the South. It says the program  would have  an explosive
effect on incomes  and would give  a powerful  boost to  black  political
movements  all  over  the  South.  The  report  also  says  that,  in  spite
of  expectations  of  both  Northerners  and  Southerners,  the  program
would merely  stabilize  population patterns  and  not trigger  a remigra-
tion  to the  South.
I  assume  that  the  nationalization  of  welfare  standards  includes
both  changing  a  fundamental  concept  and  liberalizing  the  benefits.
In  1967,  20 percent of the families in  poverty  in rural areas  received
assistance  (compared  to  26  percent  in  urban  areas).  Thus,  about
80  percent  of  the  rural  families  technically  in  poverty  were  not
receiving  assistance  because  they  did  not  qualify,  because  they  did
not  apply,  or for  other  reasons.
National  welfare  standards  could  turn  the  figures  around  by
making  80  percent  of  the  rural  poor  eligible  for  assistance.  Even
allowing for nonparticipation  slippage,  it is  easy to see  the  impressive
magnitude  of  the  proposal.  Not  only  could  as  many  as  three  times
more  people  than  are  now  participating  be  eligible  in  rural  areas,
but eligible  families  could receive  as much  as one-third  more benefits.
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tion  pattern some  seek and  others  fear and  everyone wonders  about?
Probably  not.
When  most  people  talk  about  welfare  as  an  economic  force
affecting  migration,  they  are  talking  about  comparisons  of  benefits
under  various  existing  and  proposed  programs.  An  examination  of
only  the  Aid  to  Families  with  Dependent  Children  (AFDC)  and
food  stamp  programs  reveals  a  striking  variation  among  states  in
the  current  programs  (Table  1).
TABLE  1.  TOTAL  BENEFITS  TO  A  FOUR-PERSON  FAMILY  UNDER  THE  CURRENT
AFDC  PROGRAM  PLUS  FOOD  STAMP  BONUS,  SELECTED  STATES,  1970
AFDC  Food  Stamp  Total
State  Payments  Bonus  Benefits
Alabama  $  744  $1,116  $1,860
Mississippi  578  1,188  1,766
Colorado  1,973  768  2,741
South  Dakota  2,251  696  2,947
Illinois  2,566  552  3,086
California  2,534  552  3,086
Connecticut  3,007  408  3,415
New  York  3,158  408  3,566
Annual  payments  under  the  AFDC  program  vary  from  a  low
of  $578  per family in Mississippi  to a  high of  $3,158  per family  in
New  York.  But  food  stamp  bonuses  tend  to  reduce  interstate  varia-
tions  in  total  family  benefits.  Since  the  bonus  value  computation
for  the  Food  Stamp  Plan  takes  into  consideration  income  from
AFDC  payments,  benefits  to  the  family  in  a  "low"  state  such  as
Alabama  are boosted  to $1,860  by  a  $1,116 food  stamp  bonus.  On
the  other hand,  because  of the large  AFDC payment,  the New  York
family  gets only  $408  from  food  stamps.
In  general,  families  in  the  "low"  states  receive  about  $1,800  to
$1,900  annually  with food  stamps  but only  $600  to  $700  per year
with  no  food  stamps.  The  benefit  level  with  food  stamps  for  the
"low"  states  is  about  one-half  of  the  $3,400  to  $3,600  received  by
families  in  the  "high"  states.  Without  food  stamps,  family  benefits
(AFDC  payments)  in  the  "low"  states  are  roughly  one-fourth  of
benefits  in  "high"  states.
Interstate  variations  in  potential  benefits  to  the  four-person
family  are  further  reduced  under  the  proposed  Family  Assistance
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of  Mississippi  and Alabama  would  increase  roughly  one-third  under
the  Family Assistance  Plan plus  food  stamps  as  compared  to  benefits
under  AFDC  plus  food  stamps.  In  contrast,  family  benefits  would
be  virtually  unchanged  in  the  "high"  states.  Under  the  proposed
program,  benefits  in  the  "low"  states  represent  roughly  two-thirds
of  benefits  in  "high"  states  contrasted  to  one-half  under  the  current
programs.
TABLE  2.  TOTAL  BENEFITS  TO  A FOUR-PERSON  FAMILY  HAVING  NO  EARNED
INCOME,  UNDER  CURRENT  AND  PROPOSED  PROGRAM,  SELECTED  STATES
1
Current  Proposed
State  Plan  Plan  Difference
Alabama  $1,860  $2,467  + $607
Mississippi  1,766  2,467  +  701
Colorado  2,741  2,718  - 232
South  Dakota  2,947  2,905  - 422
Illinois  3,118  3,117  - 12
California  3,086  3,095  +  9
Connecticut  3,415  3,413  - 2
New  York  3,566  3,515  - 512
'Benefits  include  AFDC  or  Family  Assistance  Plan  and  food  stamp  bonus
value.
'The  reduction  in  benefits  results  from  differences  in  the  schedule  for  food
stamps.  In  states  where  the  AFDC  payments  are  higher  than  the  basic  Family
Assistance  Plan  transfer  ($1,600  to  a  four-person  family  with  no  earned  income)
the  state  would  be  required  to  supplement  the  Family  Assistance  Plan  transfer  to
bring  the  level  up  to  the  AFDC  payment  level.  Thus,  in  such  states  the  total
Family  Assistance  Plan  payment  alone  would  equal  the  current  AFDC  payments.
On  an  hourly  basis,  the  one-third  increase  in  welfare  income
under  the  proposed  programs  in  the  "low,"  more  rural  states  of
Mississippi  and  Alabama  raise  hourly  welfare  income  about  $0.30
per  hour  (Table  3).  In  the  more  urban  states  of  Connecticut  and
New  York,  potential  hourly  welfare  income  under  both  the  current
and  proposed  programs  are  roughly  equal  to  minimum  wages  and
earnings  of  hired  farm  laborers.
This  picture  does  not  change  much  when  differences  in  cost  of
living are  considered.  An index  consisting  of  the  ratio of  the welfare
benefits  to  a family  of  four  with  zero  income  to  the  relative  cost  of
living for  a four-person  family  developed  in  the  U.S.  Department  of
Labor  shows  that  the  southern  states  have  an  index  of  31  under
AFDC  and  food  stamps  compared  to  an  index  of  45  in  Chicago
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WELFARE  PROGRAMS  VERSUS  HOURLY  WAGE  INCOME
Earnings of
Earnings  Production
Current  Proposed  Minimum  of Farm  Workers  in
State  Welfare'  Welfare'  Wage  Workers  Manufacturing
Alabama  $0.89  $1.19  $1.60  $1.18  $2.81
Mississippi  0.85  1.19  1.60  1.25  2.39
Colorado  1.32  1.31  1.60  1.63  3.50
South  Dakota  1.42  1.40  1.60  1.51  2.94
Illinois  1.50  1.50  1.60  1.74  3.60
California  1.48  1.49  1.60  1.85  3.73
Connecticut  1.64  1.64  1.60  1.86  3.38
New York  1.71  1.69  1.60  1.70  3.39
'Represents  the annual  benefits  under the  programs  as  shown in  Table  2  divided
by 2,080  hours.
and  50  for  New  York  City.  This could  be  interpreted  to  mean  that
under  the present  program  a  family  could be  19  percentage  points
better off in New York  than in the South,  that is,  their income  would
be  19 percentage points  closer to the cost of the "low living standard"
for  a four-person  family  in New  York  than  in  the  South.  Under  the
assumption  of the Family Assistance  Plan, the southern  family  would
go  up  to  41  (from  31)  on  this  scale,  while  the New  York  family
would  remain  at  50.
The  question  remains,  how  much  better  off,  or  worse  off,  do
people  think  they  will  be  living  on  41  percent  of  a  "low  living
standard"  in Alabama  than on  50 percent  of  a "low  living  standard"
in  New  York?  Obviously,  pressures  to  migrate  would  be  less,  and
perhaps  significantly  less.  But their full significance  is  unclear.  These
families  would  be  vastly  better  off,  of  course,  if  they  could  work
full  time  as  production  workers  in New  York.  But they  would  also
be better  off working  as  production  workers  in  their own  state.
Our research  has given  us  very little  insight into family  decisions
about  where  to  live.  For  some  people  there  is  a  strong  preference
against  moving.  A  very  great  disparity  in  income  will  be  tolerated
before  these  people  move.  Other  people  have  a  strong  attraction
and  curiosity  for  new  and  different  places.  These  people  frequently
will move in the face of solid  evidence  that  there  is little  opportunity
in the  new  environment.  They  may prefer  the  urban  to rural,  prefer
almost  any  change  to the  present  situation,  or simply  feel  confident
that  they  can  compete  well  enough  to  improve  themselves  even  if
competition  is  tough  as long  as  opportunities  are  greater.
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sparse  on the  balance  of  these  factors  and  how it  would  be  affected
by  a  changed  welfare  system.  The  evidence  at  hand  suggests  that
economic  pressures  to  move  would  be  reduced  by  the  proposed
Family  Assistance  Plan.  It  also  suggests  that  the  change  would  be
limited.
CONCLUSION
Nationalization  of  welfare  means,  for  practical  purposes,  stan-
dardization  of  only  minimum  welfare  standards.  Some  states  are
likely  to  provide  additional  benefits  for  persons  and  families  in
poverty.
The  economic  incentive for the poor to migrate would  be reduced
substantially  by  such  standardization.  Clearly,  noneconomic  forces
would  play  a major  role  in  deciding  the question.  Welfare  programs
are  generally  administered  locally.  Local  social  tensions  can  and
probably do  overcome  the  best intentions  of lawmakers  and national
and  state  program  administrators  in  some  cases.  The  needy  family
that is declared  not eligible  for assistance  has  a very  strong economic
incentive  to  migrate  if  they  think  they  would  be  eligible  for  help
somewhere  else.  The  incentives  are  economic,  but  the  cause  is  not.
Nationalization  of  the  program  may  make  more  money  available
and  broaden  eligibility  criteria,  but  local  administrators  still  would
be  expected  to  play  very important  roles  in  deciding  how  many  and
which  people  are  served  by  the  program.
On  the  economic  side,  the  principal  economic  forces  that  put
pressure  on poverty  families  to migrate  are  the  same  as  those  which
affect  community  and  regional  growth.
Rural areas  in the South were experiencing  much  more economic
growth  in the  last part of  the  1960's  than in  the  1950's.  Preliminary
census  data  indicate  much  better  population  retention  in  the  South-
east than in most other rural areas.  If the census bears  this out, it will
appear  that  the  black  and  rural  migration  of  the  1950's  has  stabi-
lized.  If this has not  happened,  odds are that it soon will.
For much  of  the  rest  of  the  rural  United  States,  the  picture  is
less  optimistic.  Job  growth  probably  will  be  concentrated  in  the
urban  or urbanizing  areas.  In  the  Great  Plains  and  in  many  of  the
sparsely  settled  areas,  growth  will  likely  be  slow.
In  all  of  these  areas,  economic  forces  would  be  expected  to  be
the  dominant  feature.  Population  will  follow  jobs,  and  job  growth
will  follow  current  patterns  of  economic  activity.  On  balance,  the
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some  areas.  But  the  changes  probably  will  not  lead  to  remigration
to the South or elsewhere.  Important  as such changes  could  be,  they
almost certainly  will be  less  important than the complex  of economic
and social forces  that  shaped the rural-urban  migration  of the  1950's
and  the urban  and  regional  growth  of the  1960's.
93PART  IV
Environment and
Quality of Life